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The Haven of Difficult Discourse 
 
Science was once the poor relation of art. For example, Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison, in their recent Objectivity, detail how a knowledgeable, empathetic artist’s 
rendition of a plant was considered more desirable, truer to nature, than a photograph of 
the same plant for decades after photography’s invention. The idea of “objectivity,” 
science and photography’s badge of authority, was not highly thought of, as it, by 
definition, removed all human experience and knowledge. What it took, in the end, for 
objectivity to move ahead to become the discourse of science was for “knower and 
knowledge [to be] pried apart, so that, for example, the alchemist’s failure to transmute 
base metals into gold could no longer be blamed on an impure soul.”1  
 
But alchemy didn’t wither and die when the knower and the known parted ways. It took 
up with art, where questions of the knower’s soul, as well as the soul of what is known, 
remain important, and where the base metal of experience can be transmuted into the 
finest sort of gold—that which anthropologist Michael Taussig has called “congealed 
amazement?”2  
 
A difficult alchemical example: In a letter written in prison, the legendary Marxist 
revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg wrote of looking out her cell window in Berlin and seeing 
Romanian water buffalos being beaten until they bled. Luxemburg’s death came when 
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she was struck in the head with a rifle butt, shot and thrown, bloody, into a canal by 
German soldiers. Paul Celan found poetry in these terrible events. In response, he wrote 
“Solve” and “Coagula.” These words, as poet Anne Carson reminds us in her Economy of 
the Unlost, are alchemical terms. The first names the process of the dissolution of 
primary material; the second refers to the process wherein the elements recombine in 
another, novel, form.3 Celan’s first poem describes a splintering, of Easter and more; the 
second, Luxemburg’s death. Carson, herself a brilliant poet, points out that in addition to 
the horror of the events Celan put into solution to write these two poems, by coagula he 
has also described a terrible transmutation that does not have much in common with the 
noble process of alchemists who “healed” base metals into gold. Alchemical changes 
seem always to have been positive, never involving degradation except as an intermediate 
stage in a happier process.4 
 
If Carson is correct, alchemy was and is better than science—which has had more than its 
fair share of degrading and unhappy processes. And if we take alchemy as a metaphor for 
the into-art process, art is justified in its long-time claim to be uplifting, a happier process 
than science. Art could even claim to be teleological: if the end result of every process is 
positive, then “ideas run through art” are steadily changing for the better.   
 
These two alchemical poems are one with the rest of Celan’s work—because they are 
fragmentary, polysemic, allusive, bristling with compound-neologisms. And in that they 
don’t belong to objective discourse. (One of the places where science and art still 
intersect is in that they both show how a relentless drive toward perfection will eventually 
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approach an idiolect.) And they are very much a part of the post WWII turn to difficult 
discourse. (Writing in France, Celan was in fact very near its epicenter.) Because 
something art/alchemy has done as it has separated itself from science is to increase the 
level of difficulty in the presentation of the ideas. Can this increased difficulty truly be a 
mark of a process that is “happier?” I believe the answer is yes—in fact, the more 
difficult the work of art, the more alchemical, the happier—but we can see this only if we 
are willing to admit to ourselves what is being made happier. It is not ourselves. 
 
To that end, I want to clarify what I meant when I wrote above that Celan’s poems are a 
difficult example. It is because they illustrate how Celan isn’t the only, and perhaps isn’t 
even a, knower in the creation of the poems. Celan, a Romanian who lived in France but 
wrote in German, famously worried that the German language had been permanently 
maimed “after Auschwitz.” His work is alchemical in that he was trying to 
simultaneously “heal” the German language and himself. George Steiner, in his “On 
Difficulty” refers to one of Celan’s poems as an example of a poem where “It is not so 
much the poet who speaks, but language itself: die Sprache spricht. The authentic, 
immensely rare poem is one in which ‘the Being of language’ finds unimpeded lodging, 
in which the poet is not a persona, a subjectivity ‘ruling over language,’ but an ‘openness 
to,’ a supreme listener to, the genius of speech.”5 But why, we might ask, would the 
Being of language choose to speak in such difficult terms? 
 
Novelist/essayist Samuel R. Delany was once asked about the uses of difficult discourse. 
A few excerpts from his answer: 
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[I]n difficult discourse, understanding spreads more slowly. There’s a greater gap 
between those who do understand the ideas and those with no idea at all what 
those ideas are about. Simple language, on the other hand, tends to produce a 
circle of people who understand and another circle around them who 
misunderstand, with no very clear distinction between. [Simple discourse] tends 
to blend understanding and misunderstanding into a hopeless mass and mess, so 
that, over a given period, ideas put in simple language lose their strength and 
precision relatively quickly, even when they are important ideas. . . . 
 
 
Difficult discourse delays popularization of truly important ideas until unpopular thinkers 
can become deeply familiar with the work, and can form a slowly growing group that, 
when popularizations do begin their inevitable distortions, is there to critique those 
distortions and alert people to the problems inherent in them.  
 
In short, you can reasonably argue that, in a social field that privileges simple language, 
to choose difficult discourse inaugurates a critical process, a stabilizing process, and a 
preservative process that works to criticize and stabilize important ideas for the good of 
the ideas themselves.6 
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And here is my answer to the question of what is receiving the benefit in the “happy 
process” of alchemy-in-art, the knower in the reuniting of knowing and knower: the ideas 
themselves. 
 
This idea about ideas is nothing new. It can be found expressed, with varying shades of 
meaning and to varying degrees of seriousness, across all disciplines. Josef Dietzgen, 
tanner-turned-Socialist theorist admired by thinkers ranging from Karl Marx to Walter 
Benjamin to Ben Watson, wrote of his The Nature of Human Brain-Work, “[The] 
contents of this little work are not an individual product, but a historical growth. In 
writing it, I feel myself, if I may use the mystic phrase, only as an organ of the idea.”7 
Philosopher-turned-novelist Michel Tournier insists that philosophical systems are not the 
creation of philosophers: “Obviously not. Since the more coherent is always the cause of 
the less coherent, a philosophical system with its matchless coherence is the cause of 
everything and the effect of nothing. The philosopher is nothing more than the detritus 
that the system drops into the empirical world as it is being created. . . .”8 
 
Many an artist has said, in all apparent seriousness, that a story, a painting, a musical 
phrase was not chosen by them, but “chose me.” Guy Davenport, referring to his 
unpacking of the “geography of the imagination” in Grant Wood’s American Gothic, 
betrays no sign of tongue-in-cheek or of speaking metaphorically when he writes,  
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Art knows things for the artist. Hugh [Kenner] and I have had words about that. He felt 
that I overdid my Grant Wood iconography, because Wood wasn’t aware of what I was 
showing. Of course he wasn’t.9 
 
But the art knew: the ideas reached out, veiled, solve, to Wood, and from Wood, revealed, 
coagula, by Davenport. What he doesn’t say but certainly knew, was that there are 
certainly more ideas in solution in the paintings than he mentions, or by which he could 
be reached. We, the viewers, readers, audience of a work of art, are never conscious of all 
the ideas packed into those works. But, do we even need to be conscious of ideas to be 
able to tap into them? With Davenport, I believe the answer is no. And I further believe 
it’s better if we aren’t so conscious. 
 
An easy alchemical example: We believe that an author’s psychology and biography are 
available to us in whatever characters emerge on the page; we believe, too, that an artist’s 
personality is available to us in his or her brushstroke—or lack of brushstrokes, for that 
matter. English-born, American-resident painter Trevor Winkfield applies his paint in 
coats, smoothes out all brushstrokes, strives to produce a decal-slim surface. This is so 
different from most other painters that we feel it must tell us something, even if we 
cannot articulate what that something might be.10 
 
If we believe there is so much veiled information packed into the surface of a painting, 
how much more can we believe of the images themselves? Winkfield’s work is a good 
place to look for an answer, as they are made up of recognizable elements not 
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traditionally organized. They are assembled from what strike Winkfield as associated 
images—hands, faces, bottle, figures made up of human and non-human parts, labels 
from boxes of Chinese candy—as the artist follows a trail of associations only he has: a 
visual idiolect. Viewing the paintings, we move from delight and puzzlement at their 
colorful (seeming) disorder, very quickly to “What does this mean?” Because we sense 
they mean something. John Ashbery: “Something is regulating everything and placing its 
parts in the proper relation to each other, but that thing is unknown: a blank, though a 
fundamental one.”  And Jed Perl feels there is “something ineffably English about the 
resulting combination of fantasy and precision….”11 I would suggest that “English” be 
read as the “primary material” of Winkfield’s life. And “precision” be read as just that. 
Winkfield is, in ways it doesn’t bother him that he doesn’t understand, disarticulating his 
primary material (“Solve”!) and bringing it together again (“Coagula”!) as something 
else. If he or we “understood” everything, the paintings would not be as effective. 
Because understanding is another kind of association, one idea socializing with another, a 
process for all practical purposes identical with that of metaphor, and metaphors alter 
both sides of their equation: knowing an idea “is like” something else changes both the 
idea and the something else. (Popularization, the move outward from difficult discourse, 
is this kind of socialization, as well, and so effects a change in the original isolato, the 
primary idea.) If we cannot finally “understand” a Winkfield or other difficult art, 
contemplating such compels us to something happier: standoff-ish ideas lead us to the 
hosting of new ideas—even if we can’t articulate them. This is art at its best: a hermetic 
circle that drops new ideas into the empirical world through its viewers as well as its 
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creator. And this happens because the ideas have found a haven in the difficult visual 
discourse of the paintings.  
 
Looking at Winkfield’s art, whether or not we know there are Kekulé’s-snakes style 
circuits underlying them, we certainly—with the same sense that perceives emotions in 
brushstrokes—understand that the ideas he had while he was planning his painting have 
become potentials waiting for another freeing. Following Whitehead, American painter-
turned-perceptual-theorist Adelbert Ames, Jr. felt that our perceptions, including our 
perceptions of objects, were only prognoses for future actions: or, in other words, what 
we see is what we mean to do about it. Such significances, ideas we might pick up and 
act upon, are impacted in what we naively call objects. They reside there, hidden,  until 
we give our attention to them. It is as if for our convenience we created “objects” as 
shorthand forms of reference which, if the behavioral situation demands, we can 
elaborate into the fuller significances.12 
 
Or, to return to Hugh Kenner in a register different from the one above, “Any object in 
space is a memory system.”13 This applies equally to a painting and to the chemical 
formulae that result in the paints and turpentine an artist uses. But anyone can learn a 
formula and make vermilion; only the ideas that dropped Winkfield the artist into the 
world can make the “congealed amazement” of a Winkfield painting. Vermillion can 
offer only a chemical idea that is finished, static. A Winkfield, or any other work of art, 
offers impacted ideas that can be unpacked and made “happier.”  
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This is why alchemy chose to stay with art when science deliberately emptied itself of 
human values. Scientific ideas are, through their repeatability, socialized into inert states, 
while ideas in art are alive and have the potential for growth every time the art is 
experienced.  
 
What remains is to explain why I say the “ideas themselves” act in their own interest, 
how they seek the haven of difficult discourses from Jacques Derrida to Jasper Johns. 
 
A first step might be a simple pragmatic approach, one suggested by the differences 
between science and art I have detailed. An ideal scientific theory would logically and 
volitionally exhaust its ideas, leaving beautifully constructed dead ends; a degrading and 
unhappy process for the ideas so treated.14 But the pursuit of ideas in art—if it is truly art 
and not, for example, propaganda or the hybrid of art and science we call “craft”—is not 
logical, not repeatable (an “exact copy” of a work of art gathers quite a different set of 
ideas), and not meant to be exhaustive—quite the opposite. Art is not achieved through 
the artist’s volition, in any strict sense of the word. It is, to generalize Steiner’s comment, 
where ideas “find unimpeded lodging,” where there is “an openness to . . . the genius of 
ideas.” Because, beyond the limits of the artist’s volition, ideas are there, in solve. So if 
ideas are sentient they would prefer art. And if they’re not put there by the artist’s 
volition, by the Pragmatist principle of “If it looks, acts and sounds like a [insert noun], 
call it a [insert noun],” ideas can be said to be sentient.   
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But there is more, within the question of how we know that anyone or anything other than 
ourselves is sentient. Some Buddhist ideas help here, those that assert that any creature 
(and, the same belief holds, a “creature” can be completely mental in nature) whose 
survival strategies and actions appear to be motivated by the avoidance of suffering 
should be assumed to be sentient. I have tried to suggest the alchemical strategies of 
ideas, tried to illustrate how their actions move them out of harm’s way behind difficult 
discourses. But it may be as simple as comparing the actions of ideas to the only 
sentience we know—our own. My own view of mind is that suggested by Ames and 
other Process Philosophers, a view that does not deny there is a reality, only that we can 
have no direct experience or knowledge of it. All that we can know, all the information 
that comes in through our perceptions, are prognoses for future actions: all our 
knowledge is gathered in support of furthering our ends, of surviving conflict, of 
achieving happiness. What I have tried to describe above, all we can perceive of the 
actions of ideas, gives the appearance of ideas having survival strategies, and of trying to 
avoid suffering, that is, avoiding the degrading exhaustions of science in favor of the 
alchemical happiness of art—including the language art of difficult discourse. 
 
If ideas’ evidence for sentience is indistinguishable our own, then either ideas are sentient 
or we have no way of knowing if we are. More simply put, they are as sentient as we are. 
As I have said, this is not a new idea, and more importantly it is—I would point out in 
support—a difficult idea, as well. 
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